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Abstract. Diplomacy often finds itself reduced to actions centred on states. However, after 
the Cold War, international relations and diplomacy have expanded with different actors 
growing into significant roles, particularly in the increase of diplomatic relations in the 
context of sport. The classification and significance of other actors remains under-researched 
in relation to sport, with literature focusing more on the growth of new and varying practices 
of diplomacy. This analysis contends that there is a need to interrogate fundamental 
components of modern diplomacy – with the actor being the focus – more specifically the 
classification of sports organisations in diplomacy. It is relevant as a more accurate 
understanding of sports organisations will contribute to how diplomatic studies can analyse 
and evaluate modern diplomacy within the context of sport. The International Olympic 
Committee is the actor used to illustrate how problematic classifications currently in the 
academic literature translate into weak and reduced analysis and evaluation of its role and 
significance in diplomacy. As counterpoint, this analysis proposes an analytical framework 
of socio-legal theory that harnesses legal regulation as a benchmark to classify an actor’s 
capacity within a society. In consequence, the IOC is as an active and significant contributor 
to the ever expanding and complex diplomatic environment and wider society.    
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Imagine an undemocratic, unelected, transnational, multi-billion dollar, not-for-profit 
non-governmental organisation having the power to leverage and affect the legal landscape 
of a nation-state. Imagine further that such legal changes have the potential of altering states’ 
political, economic, and social fabric. This exercise is not hypothetical but descriptive of the 
current manner in which the International Olympic Committee [IOC] operates on the 
international stage. There are few studies of this phenomenon, in particular on the 
classification and credibility of the role of sports organisations in international relations and 
diplomacy. In a recent survey of academic work on sport and politics, Martin Polley 
celebrated the move away from the early sport politics literature – with its narrow focus on 
“international relations and diplomacy” by such scholars as Richard Espy and John 
Hoberman 1  – to those with broader political interest. This analysis contributes to a 
(re)emerging inter-disciplinary literature focusing on international relations and diplomacy.  
Because of its many roles in and influences on diplomacy, the IOC has received 
inappropriate classification.2  It goes beyond mere linguistic accuracy for the actions and 
influence of the IOC do not tally with the current run-of-the-mill acronyms given to classify 
such actors in academic literature. These include non-state actor, international sports 
organisation, and international non-governmental organisation [INGO]. Fundamentally, there 
is a disjoint between the actions and the classification of the IOC – this mismatch translates 
into a misunderstanding and diluted analysis and evaluation of its diplomatic role. 
Consequently, there is a need to revisit how sports organisations are conceptualised in 
diplomatic discussions both methodologically and analytically. The IOC is an ideal case 
study, as it unconventionally balances multiple roles of business, governance, overseeing 
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event, hosting, regulator, social activist, and so on. The multitude of activities and roles 
undertaken under the umbrella of Olympism renders the organisation an anomaly in the 
traditional understanding of actors in international relations, diplomacy, and many other 
social science disciplines.  
Ramifications including a vague and reductive understanding of the IOC and its role 
in diplomacy challenges the conceptual slippage of sports organisations. To contest this 
process, a socio-legal theoretical framework enables a better understanding and evaluation of 
the complex entity of the IOC as a global organisation acting at numerous levels with varying 
significance.  Socio-legal theory draws upon traditional and non-traditional legal evidence 
that empirically shows how (re)creation of law and regulations occur. It is not the intention to 
define and analyse completely the IOC but, instead, to offer an analytic tool with which to 
classify it through empirical and clear conceptualisation, accordingly encouraging more 
rigorous and credible research of its significance in diplomacy.  
The rise of sport as both an interdisciplinary lens and a context within which to 
understand social phenomena has complemented the onset of theory across the social 
sciences that challenge the more traditional state-centred, positivist understandings of the 
world. Positivist accounts dominated social science theory until the end of the Cold War, 
with scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz in international relations, taking the nation-state as the 
central actor in all global relations.3  In diplomatic studies, sport has sometimes emerged as 
an icebreaker in stand-offs between states, for example the “Ping Pong” diplomacy between 
China and America in the early 1970s. 4   Yet, in the post-Cold War era in changing 
circumstances, there has been a shift to understand and explain how actors other than the 
state can have diplomatic significance.  An initial difficulty in doing so is access to evidence. 
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Research on the state-centric diplomatic use of sport, such as “Ping Pong” diplomacy, has 
occurred by using government archives and documents usually unavailable until circa thirty 
years after the event.5 Consequently, when considering sport in the current era, diplomatic 
scholars cannot have access to such documents; instead they rely on available media, 
interviews, and public documents amongst other secondary sources. This situation poses 
issues of credibly evaluating the role of sport beyond being an icebreaker, pertinent given the 
growth of sport organisations’ agency has been most significant in the past 30 years.  
The difficulty in studying contemporary diplomacy finds support from Heather 
Dichter, who cites the rarity in diplomatic studies of considering a government’s public 
diplomacy strategy through hosting a sports mega-event. Largely because of the increased 
scale of sport mega events in the past 25 years, therefore, research relies on media sources 
rather than government documents.6 The reality of the constraints of researching diplomacy 
in the present-day is a significant issue for sport scholars attempting to understand and 
explain the impact and significance of sports organisations. A way in overcoming these 
restrictions has been to apply vague and cautionary conclusions, with more confidence 
placed in framing new strategies and practices of diplomacy rather than actors. For example, 
Steve Jackson has recently labelled sport in diplomatic terms to be “schizophrenic” as it “is 
considered both serious and important but insignificant and trivial at different times”. He 
suggests a practice of “corporate diplomacy” to frame sports organisations, but not a way in 
which to classify or evaluate sports organisations as actors.7 This example contributes to a 
pattern where common themes of vague classification and lack of empirical markers are 
evident in multiple sport diplomatic research. It unproductively leads to labels and 
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conclusions such as “schizophrenic” that in reality do not help an understanding of sports 
organisations and, instead, may even further confuse it. 
This pattern affects both major strands of sport diplomacy literature: “sport as 
diplomacy” and “diplomacy in sport”. 8  The latter is concerned with how governments 
consciously employ sport as an instrument to leverage their interests in wider diplomacy -- as 
seen in the “Ping Pong” example. A more modern case is the recent strategy of the Bosnian 
government to gain international recognition through the IOC to gain momentum and 
leverage in the wider international community. This case is consistent with traditional 
diplomatic theory: state-centred and viewing the nation-state as the contingent actor. In terms 
of classification, Dario Brentin and Loic Remy evaluate the role of the IOC as low-level 
diplomacy, difficult to judge its impact. 9  Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Pigman further 
demonstrate this issue by stating that the Olympics is a site and form of sport diplomacy, but 
it is “complicated”. They vaguely classify the IOC as a Great Power. 10 The vague and 
hesitant conclusions of “low level” and “complicated” stem from the initial inaccurate 
classification of the IOC as an actor instead relying on claims that it is a “great power”.  As a 
result, the need is to reconceptualise sports organisations with a view to credibly classifying 
and in turn evaluating the significance in diplomacy. 
There are examples of authors seeking to classify sports organisations; Burak 
Herguner seeks to place the IOC within international relations theory, namely Samuel 
Huntington’s 1973 characteristics of transnational organisations. This classification finds 
basis on the structure and membership of the organisation, similar to that of literature around 
non-state actors. Herguner states that the “IOC may be classified both as a transnational 
organisation [TNO] and an international non-governmental organisation”, thus making the 
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IOC a “TNO-INGO”.11 The empirical evidence emerges through the concept of soft power 
that allows the IOC “as a transnational organisation . . . [to] maintain a balance between 
national governments, the business environment and civil society”. 12 This TNO-INGO is 
productive but does not explicitly offer a concept that can be marked or evaluated. Instead, it 
reduces the opportunity to understand rigorously the IOC as either an actor in itself or how it 
balances and leverages states, business, and civil society. It implies that the IOC is a passive 
actor that balances the interests of other actors, whereas in examining the IOC shows it to be 
an active actor that has growing agency in diplomatic relations.  
The literature that has moved away from regarding sport as purely a practice of state-
based diplomacy frames “sport as diplomacy” where sport is a site of diplomacy in more 
multi-actor and specialised circumstances.13 In this shift, the actors and strategies are not 
purely state-to-state or based on leveraging national interests. For example, Barbara Keys 
focuses on the development of the approach of Human Rights Watch, a human rights INGO, 
to leverage the Olympics against states seen to breach human rights.14 She sees the role of 
Human Rights Watch as central in developing an argument about how diplomatic strategies 
advance against a state through sport. Still, compared to more traditional state-centred 
diplomatic literature, research such as this is not as widespread,15 attributable to the lack of 
access to credible evidence – raised above; hence, what would be relevant is an analytical 
tool to classify actors and their significance.  
qqThe shift in diplomatic literature to consider non-state-based diplomacy has 
occurred outside of sport literature.16 It is not to argue that the nation-state has disappeared, 
but that it is no longer always the primary actor in modern diplomacy.  Richard Langhorne 
summarises that a combination of the end of the Cold War, the information revolution, 
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increasing and diverse experts, the rise in the number of states, and the dispersion of national 
interests has “increased the significance of global institutions and globally operating private 
entities, both public and commercial”.17 Moreover, the environment of diplomacy has shifted.  
As Joseph Nye suggests, “power in the world is distributed in a pattern that resembles a 
complex three-dimensional chess game with the unipolar military power on top, multipolar 
economic power in the middle and the realm of transnational relations” the bottom board.18 
In fact, the growing complexity and multitude of diplomatic relations and power challenges 
more traditional conceptualisation of actors. Herguner amongst others who classify sports 
organisations within traditional frameworks are no longer adequate because they are too 
static and fixed. 
The evolving complexity of diplomacy has engaged with sports literature; however, 
the tendency has been to focus on the new forms of diplomatic practices such as digital, 
public, corporate, network, and club rather than the actors.19 For example, Aaron Beacom 
proposes the concept of “Olympic diplomacy” that due to the varied nature of actors and 
agendas “does not lend itself to conceptual clarity”.20 The IOC is cited as a key actor, but in 
more specific reference it is categorised as “an international organization and with aspirations 
to extend its influence in international affairs”.21 Beacom frames varying categories within 
“Olympic diplomacy” based on the multitude of activities relating to the Olympic movement, 
for example, “support diplomacy” that encapsulates logistical actors and activities.22 In an 
attempt to conceptualise the complexity of strategies and actors involved, Beacom does not 
account for how analytically to classify the sports or wider organisations involved. The 
understanding of the proliferation of diplomatic strategies is productive; nonetheless, the 
classification of the main actors is another key to evaluate and counter the noted conceptual 
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obscurity. It aligns with the pattern of the difficulty in producing contemporary evidence of 
diplomacy around sport organisations, leading to vague classifications and conclusions of 
how to analyse or evaluate their wider role in diplomatic studies.   
As an alternative, in a novel approach, the use of legal sources and theories help 
clarify and articulate a sports organisation’s structure and role as an international actor. 
Socio-legal theory is a branch of legal studies that has argued for an interdisciplinary 
approach to investigating the relationship between law and society because, historically, legal 
scholars have concentrated on traditional sources of law such as state-based legal doctrine. It 
is comparable to the traditional international relations and diplomatic literature using state-
based underpinnings. Studies in socio-legal theory have shown that law is unidirectional and 
has a top down influence over society;23 but that this state-centric approach to law should be 
challenged.24 Moreover, in the changing national and international landscapes, the state is 
less the primary regulator. Consequently, theory must respond to this development and view 
society, plus a larger variety of actors, as having an impact on law and regulation. This again 
relates to the problems identified in literature of diplomacy and sports organisations as a 
wider range of actors are playing an increasing role in such contexts. 
To understand a sports organisation as a source of law or regulation, legal pluralism 
offers an understanding beyond traditional legal structures. Varying spaces, actors, and 
structures are sources that produce and reproduce law. 25  Fundamentally, legal pluralism 
challenges a traditional and positivist reading of law, trying to shift towards a more open and 
responsive view.26 It aligns with the thought that the state and assumed fixed structures must 
be decentred, leading to a more exact understanding of other actors. Wider diplomatic 
analyses have advocated such a decentring, for example, Brian Hocking and his colleagues 
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discussed an integrative diplomacy framework: “simplistic images of diplomacy seen as 
either a state (modern) or post-state (post-modern) set of structures and processes fails to 
capture the complexities” in modern diplomacy.27 The use of legal sources in the following 
case study complements a move away from simplistic images of diplomatic structures and 
actors. It offers an analytical tool to demonstrate how to evaluate the significance and role of 
a sports organisation; in turn, it refines the classification of actors and the roles they play in 
diplomatic situations. It also does not isolate this tool to sports organisations or the IOC; 
further research can form a wider spectrum of analysis 
Socio-legal theory has occurred before in a sport context; for example, Bo Carlsson 
employed the framework to show how the consumption of popular culture through sport 
video games is “a significant source of normative (re-)production of law and morality in 
society”.28 The changing nature and source of society is less systematic and structural, but 
more based on fluid norms and the influence of varying actors. 29   The role of norms, 
identities, and individuals increasingly appear in diplomatic literature, in particular around 
understanding the role of sports organisations.  For example, J. Simon Rofe frames the 
football club, Manchester United, around its balance of identities in football, commerce, and 
international finance.30 What socio-legal offers is a complementary analytical tool to provide 
further empirical evidence and markers to make such research increasingly credible and 
rigorous. It elevates the problem highlighted by Dichter around government archives and 
documents being unavailable to provide evidence about modern diplomatic issues.  Largely 
because legal regulation is a source of classifying sports organisation using documents, 
records, and statistics from amongst other outlets, they are publicly accessible or easily 
requested. 
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The aim of this exegesis is to offer an analytical tool with which to classify a sports 
organisation to further diplomatic discussions. An important step follows: to identify what 
and how sports organisations find classification in a number of disciplines with focus on the 
IOC. Sports organisations in their simplest form arrange sports competitions and are 
responsible for sports development and sustainability. Nonetheless, more complex in its 
current form, the IOC both theoretically and in reality displays traits from varying traditional 
actors such as a multi-national corporation [MNC], INGO, or non-state actor. Depending on 
the discipline evaluating the role of the organisation, different roles emerge. For example, in 
a purely legal context and treated as exceptional, the IOC has a credible legal capacity.31  
Mark James states that the IOC has recognition “under Swiss Law as an association with a 
distinct legal personality”. 32  Not only does this follow the above pattern of diplomatic 
literature as being vague in the use of “exceptional”, it also supports the need to revisit the 
IOC as a complex and interdisciplinary organisation. 
The origins of the IOC lay with its founder, Pierre de Coubertin, who had the desire 
after France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871 to make French male citizens 
stronger through the means of sport.33 Over a century of development later, the Olympic 
movement balances not just sport, business, and politics, but also ethics and many other 
projects within the ever-changing realm of the international community.  The IOC is an 
MNC because owns the rights to and facilitates a global sports mega-event every two years. 
The global scale can be highlighted by the estimated cost of hosting an event, the past four 
being Beijing 2008 (US$43 billion), Vancouver 2010 (US$8.9 billion), London 2012 
(US$13.9 billion), and Sochi 2014 (US$51 billion).34  The host nations and the IOC covered 
these astronomic costs through sources such as selling television rights, sponsorships, and 
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public funding.  London 2012’s television coverage highlights the global reach of the Games: 
it exceeded 100,000 hours of Games and had record viewing on television in Britain and 
America, and online in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 35 This marks the IOC as a global 
institution in control of one of the most sustained and largest international events – the 
Olympics. Accordingly, its reach makes the organisation truly global in nature with the 
ability to reach a diverse audience. 
Through the “The Olympic Partner” programme, the sponsorship of the Olympics 
from private organisations is what crucially makes the IOC a private firm and independent of 
state funding. In the current cycle ending at the summer games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, the 
programme has accumulated over US$1 billion, with a view to the next cycle to reach US$2 
billion.36 From a purely economic perspective, the IOC as an actor is a MNC because it 
raises money and uses it to grow and sustain the organisation. Much literature and the 
popular press have questioned where exactly this money goes, a subject beyond the scope of 
this analysis, but one worthy of further debate.37 What is important to note is that the scale 
and the global nature of the business that the IOC conducts renders it akin to a MNC with the 
financial acumen to leverage its own interests.38 
The other significant role that the IOC plays is around moral responsibility and its 
dissemination of Olympism values globally.  Olympism encapsulates the thoughts that 
inspired Coubertin to revive the movement in the first place, as sport can positively benefit 
communities around the world. The “Olympic Charter”, a document to which each member 
must agree to compete at any Olympic Games, articulates this inspiration.39 The “Charter” is 
a main source of regulation in socio-legal terms for the IOC, with the historical essence of 
Olympism capturing the spirit of competition that global athletes display and disperse among 
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spectators. Olympic spirit is more important for the IOC than medals or winning. It is clear in 
the “Olympic Charter” by which the IOC does not base its membership on elite performance 
or medals tables but through its dictum: “Olympism as a philosophy of life . . . the practice of 
sport is a human right”.40 The document and its values overlay the leveraging opportunity 
provided by the size and scope of the Games to form an organisation that does not seek to 
extend or protect territory but uses sport to achieve a multitude of objectives. The gulf 
between rhetoric and reality within the “Olympic Charter” is a subject heavily contested in 
the academic literature – but not in the scope of this analysis.41 
What is more pertinent is the existing practice: the IOC advocates this philosophy 
actively in varying facets. For example, Sebastian Coe, the chair of the London Organising 
Committee for the 2012 Olympic Games and now president of the International Association 
of Athletics Federations [IAAF], stated at the most recent Olympic Congress that sport is a 
“hidden social worker . . . a source of international understanding . . . uniquely powerful 
bridgehead in addressing seemingly intractable problems”.42 From this point of view, the 
IOC positions itself as a social activist that seeks to fulfil its moral code outlined in the 
“Olympic Charter”. The organisation has more explicitly communicated this goal: from 2015, 
the preamble in press releases and other communication outlets states: 
The International Olympic Committee is a not-for-profit independent international 
organisation made up of volunteers, which is committed to building a better world 
through sport. It redistributes more than 90 per cent of its income to the wider 
sporting movement, which means that every day the equivalent of USD 3.25 million 
goes to help athletes and sports organisations at all levels around the world.43 
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This statement illustrates the awareness of the IOC’s position and the need to show that it 
uses considerable wealth and reach to be a credible ethical international organisation. From a 
classification perspective, the IOC straddles being both an MNC, such as Coca Cola, and an 
INGO, like Green Peace. The contemporaneous IOC could also find grouping as a private, 
profit-making firm with the humanistic intention of improving communities globally, making 
its classification as an actor in diplomacy difficult. 
The IOC in practice is more and more mixing its leverage as an economically 
powerful body with its ethical aspirations, something demonstrated in its partnership with the 
United Nations [UN], the most powerful international governmental organisation. As of 2009, 
the IOC received observer status at the UN, pioneering such initiatives as the Olympic 
Truce.44 An example came in September 2015 when the IOC committed a US$2 million fund 
in response to the humanitarian disaster around refugees.45 National Olympic Committees 
[NOCs], which are satellite organisations in nation-states comparable to IOC embassies, 
distributed this fund. The IOC has taken this active and independent role more aggressively 
since the end of the Cold War, driven by Juan Antonio Samaranch – a former diplomat – the 
IOC president between 1980 and 2001 who made the organisation more efficient and self-
sufficient.46 This development assisted the IOC in becoming more significant diplomatically. 
Still, markers and classification of this trend are difficult to show – the strength of socio-legal 
theory is that it reflects this evolution through legal and regulatory mechanisms. 
The current IOC president, Thomas Bach, has set out further to develop the IOC to 
counter perceptions that it is a  corrupt and sedentary organisation by implementing reform in 
the shape of Agenda 2020 – that is, 20 + 20 [=40] – recommendations for reform.47 It is a 
“roadmap” for the future of the Olympic movement and gives a clear indication that internal 
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reform will make the IOC “fit for purpose” in the twenty-first century. The success and 
measure of such rhetoric will become apparent in the coming years. A problematic fact is that 
in its 120-year history, the IOC has had just nine presidents – all male and five from 
European nobility.48 This unrepresentative make-up has led to a description of the IOC as “an 
old boys club”. 49  Whilst acknowledging this claim, what are more pertinent are the 
endeavours of its presidents, such as Samaranch or Bach, to develop the organisation to meet 
the needs of a wider global landscape in an active manner that contributes to how it is 
classified. 
The active manner, including reform and continuing sporting and non-sporting 
projects, challenges existing understandings of the organisation. For example, Barrie 
Houlihan has argued that the IOC is able merely to “voice and protect sports interests when 
they are subject to debate in other policy communities”.50 This standpoint, evidenced by the 
UN observer status and refugee fund, can undermine the grown power and significance of the 
IOC, a claim supported by a breadth of literature.51 The socio-legal-based analytical tool 
offers evidence to highlight, evaluate, and identify how powerful and significant the IOC is, 
addressing both its complexity and the need to find a common language and currency from 
which to classify and then interrogate its capacity as an actor in varying disciplines, more 
specifically in diplomacy. 
The evolution of the bidding process highlights the significance of IOC influence on 
traditional legal doctrines. From the first modern Olympic Games in 1896 until the mid-
twentieth century, selecting hosts and bids occurred in an informal manner.52 It has escalated 
to the present situation where the IOC has an independent evaluation committee for each 
round of bids, and there is nearly a decade’s worth of preparation needed to bid and host an 
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Olympic games by a host city and national government.  Allen Guttmann among others has 
traced the change and reform, citing the growing demand and need to be impartial in the 
process as the catalyst for this escalation.53  In consulting Olympic documents, there is an 
even clearer change to the organisation’s approach over time. The bidding process develops 
significantly towards technocratic and bureaucratic methods that demand increasing control 
and concession from the host city and nation-state. Moreover, there is a distinct change in the 
level to which the IOC expects a host and participants to accommodate its legal – amongst 
other – requirements. 
Contrasting two bidding questionnaires from 1963 and 2004 illustrates this change. 
First, in its 1963 Questionnaire to potential applicants of the 1968 Winter Olympics, the IOC 
listed questions from A to N ranging from provision for a fine arts programme to the 
proposal for the Olympic village location. The only reference to a legal framework was 
question “N”: “Will you guarantee that the Games will be conducted properly and in 
accordance with Olympic Rules and Regulations, if they are awarded to your city”?54 This 
informal question implied respect for the “Olympic Charter” and the Olympic movement but 
did not prescribe any concrete way of achieving it; instead, it found basis more on good faith 
between the host state and city. In contrast, the questionnaire sent out in 2004 for the 2012 
Summer Olympics was over 250 pages with requirements and questions split into themes. 
“Legal aspects” encompassed four dedicated pages, which included a codified covenant 
obtained from the government, local, and regional authorities to respect the Charter, 
understand that the commitments were binding, and fulfilled obligations to protect the 
Olympic trademark and governance of the Games.55 
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The contrast between 1963 and 2004 represents a shift in IOC outlook and 
organisation. Copious documents and committees to review bid applications replaced 
informal and top down administration.  Reasons as to why this shift has happened include the 
need to protect the Olympic symbol and ethos, gain impartiality and independence from 
nation-states, and the temporal growth of the size and ambition of hosting the Olympic 
Games. The further demonstration of IOC independence appears by the mechanism of having 
NOCs in each member-state of the Olympic movement – there is an ad hoc organisation 
created specifically for hosting, such as the London Olympic Committee of the Olympic and 
Paralympic Games [LOCOG]. These organisations – although based in the nation-state – are 
to be satellite organisations regulated through and by the IOC. This process shows how the 
IOC has gained greater autonomy and continues to use it for regulatory influence and 
monitoring of the Olympic Movement in nation-states. 
This independence of the IOC and its influence on members and hosts of the Olympic 
movement is a key dimension to justify it as an active diplomatic actor. The literature has 
considered this growing influence over the nation-state. For example, Alexander Miguel 
Mestre’s classification, interpreting the IOC’s influence, relies not on force but on the 
“transcendent socio-economic quality the Olympic Games possess”.56 A socio-legal theory 
framework can marker this influence through the example in the London 2012 Summer 
Games when, in committing to hosting the event, the British government allowed LOCOG to 
create and control the event. The government published documents outlining its support and 
ambition for the Games;57 but its role was used more to protect and guarantee hosting the 
Olympic movement, such as the introduction of the London Olympic Games and Paralympic 
Games Act 2006.58 This legislation extensively laid out how the national government would 
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accommodate regulatory demands from the IOC, which included regulations and 
enforcement around the “Protection of the Olympic Symbol”, allowing the IOC to 
monopolise who was authorised to sell, distribute, and profit within London from the use of 
their Olympic symbol. 
In practice it was reported that in 2012 over 300 enforcement officers would patrol 
British businesses to uphold this regulation, and that at 40 Olympic venues, “800 retailers 
have been banned from serving chips to avoid infringing fast-food rights secured by 
McDonald’s”.59 This evidence from open access bidding documents, legal papers, and media 
reports allows an overview of how the IOC through hosting the Games has gained 
unprecedented power to regulate varying elements of a state through legal mechanisms. This 
snapshot is credible evidence to classify the IOC as an active global regulatory institution. 
Regardless, as a snapshot, it is not possible to generalise, largely as it is contextual to 
nation-states that host the Olympics; moreover the IOC does not necessarily enforce or hold 
the nation-state accountable beyond the requirements it prescribes. Thus, the nation-state is 
still active in the process. Further investigation reveal examples of backlash from groups and 
nation-states to the control demanded by the IOC. In the 2022 Winter Olympics bidding race, 
the IOC had only two candidates from which to choose – China and Kazakhstan – even 
though seven cities originally showed interest.60 Norway withdrew from this bidding in a 
very public and resistant manner, as the media leaked unreasonable demands made by the 
IOC. 61  This led to increased public concern over the cost and, ultimately, Norway’s 
parliament refused to provide financial guarantees. One of the reports cited demands around 
the cartel nature of advertising – that “even street vendors must be removed” – but framed 
around the distrust of allowing such commercial control not necessarily being legal.62 This 
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backlash highlights that the growth and influence of the IOC is not unidirectional but varies 
depending on what international actors and states with which it engages. Therefore, the 
analytical tool of legal regulation becomes more relevant; such a tool allows a researcher to 
compare and contrast the level of influence and leverage that the IOC has over another actor, 
in this case the varying cities proposing to host the Games. 
In reaction to the changing perceptions and role, the IOC is realigning its projects and 
organisation so that it does not solely rely on the hosting of events and individual host states. 
Two examples of these changes are the further permanent codification of the “Olympic 
Charter” and a more stable access to a global audience through television. First, the IOC is 
supporting international bodies and states to cement the “Olympic Charter” in their 
constitutions. To date, Turkey has incorporated the entire “Olympic Charter” into its legal 
system, and the European Union codified the acknowledgement that there are “obligations 
arising from the Olympic Charter”. 63  This wider and more permanent strategy is not 
widespread, but it shows the scope and ambition the IOC has for its regulatory mechanism 
that is tangibly the “Olympic Charter”. 
Second, the internal reform of the IOC through Agenda 2020 is targeting a more 
sustained contact with a global audience.  One of the recommendations to “launch an 
Olympic [broadcast] Channel” stems from the continued emphasis of digital techniques of 
communication and networks, which can reach a multitude of individuals.64  In digital and 
public diplomacy, it could become an IOC mechanism to engage with citizens globally. 
Internationally there are limitations on television rights and internet exposure; however, if a 
nation-state legally allows the IOC this Channel, the IOC will have a clear and direct 
influence within states towards their citizenry on a more permanent basis. 
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The future ambitions and growth of the IOC and its “Olympic Charter” can be 
monitored through legal mechanisms created by internal reform and agreements reached with 
varying organisations. Continuing research into the IOC can harness a socio-legal 
classification of the organisation as a benchmark to evaluate and interrogate varying 
strategies and situations.  The traditional legal doctrines influenced by the IOC are largely 
tangible and based around economic or political spheres; conversely, as noted, the IOC 
attempts to influence more intangible societal issues. A strength of using socio-legal theory 
and legal pluralism is the ability to integrate non-traditional and more nuanced ways in which 
the IOC regulates legal issues at a social and cultural level.  
A major social issue that the IOC has on its agenda is gender equality, which is 
somewhat ironic as Coubertin initially banned women from participating, and there was 
considerable energy taken to sustain women’s participation. 65  In the present moment in 
Agenda 2020, there is a continued commitment to “stimulate women’s participation and 
involvement in sport”, a complementary policy to the organisational entity of the Women and 
Sport Commission that was formally recognised as an advisory group to the IOC Executive 
Committee in 2004.66 Not only is this a priority of the IOC, but it is a distinguished self-
measurement of the progress made through ethical governance. For example, to celebrate its 
success in this area, the IOC released an emotive video on International Women’s Day 2015 
that had images and videos of women throughout the Olympic movement accompanied by 
statistics highlighting the percentage of female participants: in the London 1908 games, it 
was 1.8 percent; whereas in London 2012, it rose to 44.2 percent.67 This endeavour is not 
only another example of the use of digital media to access the global citizenry, but it also 
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shows how the IOC believes itself to be pioneering gender empowerment over the past 
century. 
On the surface, these statistics are very impressive; yet, when further explored, 
contextual and micro differences become apparent. A study into female representation of 
NOCs shows that the IOC actively seeks to demonstrate how it upholds gender 
empowerment through the “Olympic Charter”. The IOC has set a minimum target of 20 
percent women on executive committees of NOCs and international federations. Results 
show that Asia at 12 percent and Europe at 14.1 percent failed to meet the threshold, whereas 
Oceania at 26.2 percent and the Americas at 20.5 percent met the suggested target.68 Such 
goals stemming from the “Olympic Charter” are evidence that active regulating and imposing 
IOC societal-based aspirations are achievable at varying levels in the organisation and its 
satellites such as the NOCs. What is interesting is that the more successful geographical areas 
of the globe do not include Europe; hence, this evidence goes beyond a predicted and 
generalised influence but delves into specific global regions. An organisational target is a 
non-traditional source of legal regulation as it is not a codified restriction, but a regulatory 
pressure that alters the structures and decisions taken, for example, in recruitment or training 
of staff. 
Another way to interrogate the claimed progress of the IOC in the area of gender 
empowerment is through the further breakdown of the participation of females in specific 
countries. For example, as cited above, Turkey has codified the “Olympic Charter” in its 
legal system, yet there is tension in Turkey as female empowerment clashes with the cultural 
and religious norms of this significantly Moslem country. Leila Sfier notes that Turkey in 
1936 was “one of the most Westernized Muslim countries, [was] the first to send two women 
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athletes to the Olympic Games”; however, she continues that the conditions still find basis on 
the Islamic request of “absolute segregation of the sexes”.69  Consequently, the IOC has 
incrementally improved female participation, but not systemically as Turkey does not 
embrace in full Olympism as it applies to participation through segregation. 
The London 2012 Games also observed this incremental change where the Moslem 
states Saudi Arabia, Brunei, and Qatar all sent female athletes for the first time. These 
countries have not allowed the IOC “Charter” to play such a dominant role in their behaviour, 
although they did concede to pressure to “allow women to participate in the Olympic 
Games”.70 This incremental change based on participation or governance statistics is not true 
of all areas of the IOC and the contributing nations. For example, Turkey during London 
2012 had 69.57 percent male Paralympic athletes; but of 27 accredited coaches with the IOC, 
zero were female. 71  The more negative statistics here cannot overstate the incremental 
change in participation to a systemic change in behaviour towards women; but the IOC does 
have credible influence through its “Charter” and regulation. Consequently, the use of a 
socio-legal analysis allows for a greater and more nuanced analysis of the IOC as an actor 
and its significance. The evidence from available data, domestic laws, and IOC reports show 
that the IOC is actively promoting female empowerment. Although not exaggerated, it gives 
a marker to whom and how it is regulating and influencing as an actor. 
A challenge could be that states conform to gain support from the IOC to host a future 
Olympic Games. For example, Istanbul has bid for the summer games five times, most 
recently losing in the 2013 selection to host the 2020 Games.72 It is a key consideration, and 
one that is possible to use to evaluate further the significance of the IOC’s regulatory ability. 
The significance is strong considering the example of states such as Turkey that do follow 
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the IOC mechanism – granted that it might do so to achieve certain ends. However, there are 
examples of states challenging the mechanisms outlined by the IOC, such as Russia and the 
dispute over sexuality at the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics.73 The varying conformity and 
influence of the IOC outlines the complexity and ungeneralised effects on different actors 
expected in the intricate landscape of international relations and diplomacy. A strength of 
using a socio-legal standpoint to classify the IOC is that legal regulation is comparative 
across contexts and actors, such as the cases of Turkey and Russia. It further affirms the aim 
of exploring the tool to further the classification of the IOC, rather than providing a 
traditional label and judgement of the organisation. The flexible yet rigorous tool can 
contribute to research of both tangible and intangible regulatory influences, and the ability to 
classify the IOC as an actor beyond merely reducing the organisation to an MNC or INGO. 
Thus, as demonstrated in the case studies, the understanding of the IOC in contemporary 
diplomacy can receive interrogation that is more credible. 
In conclusion, offering this analytical tool allows for discussion on the classification 
of the IOC and other sports organisations. It is not simply a linguistic argument but, rather, 
one that warns that the mislabelling of the IOC across disciplines translates into a 
misunderstanding of its role – as shown in diplomatic literature, it has led to vague 
conclusions and a lack of evidence to credibly marker arguments. The case for re-thinking 
the classification of the IOC has been justified by showing that the body operates complex 
and multiple roles – as an MNC, a TNO, and an international sports organisation, to name 
but a few. The complexity and multi-faceted composition of the IOC lends itself to a more 
dynamic and interdisciplinary device; and socio-legal theory provides an adequate 
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framework to produce a stratagem and therefore a clearer classification. It complements this 
dynamic growth of modern diplomacy. 
The extant sport diplomacy literature and debates have shied away from classifying 
the IOC in its contemporary form, instead focusing more on the increase in diplomatic 
practices more generally and how the IOC contributes to this through traditional 
classifications. Introducing an interdisciplinary socio-legal tool shows that both in theory and 
practice, the IOC wields unprecedented international influence over social, political, and 
economic legal regulation in varying levels and on varying audiences. 
The distinction between traditional and non-traditional sources of legal regulation 
allow for an exploration of both tangible and intangible changes to the international – and to 
a state’s – political, economic, and social fabric. There is a gap in knowledge about how the 
IOC influences a larger variety of levels both tangibly and intangibly – here, the cases of host 
nations and female empowerment were two of many harnessed through a socio-legal 
classification. Furthermore, such research would be useful in using more context and 
community specific evidence for how the IOC as a global regulatory institution has an impact 
on different actors. Different organisations such as the UN or Human Rights Watch are 
interacting with the IOC to leverage diplomacy; moreover, there is a growing trend of 
undemocratic and non-western states bidding for the Olympic Games. The relationship and 
regulation between the IOC and such actors would be important to add strength to the 
analytic tool advocated here. 
A wider challenge is to develop and extend this classification to a spectrum of sports 
organisations. How does Manchester United or the IAAF, for example, measure up as 
regulatory institutions, not only in terms of sport, but also in terms of diplomatic strategy and 
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leverage? This analysis has conceptually grounded such a spectrum, promoting an expansion 
with more sports organisations fundamental to sport and diplomacy studies moving forward.  
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